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Abstract
In the following, we examine a market of a digital consumption good with
monopolistic supply. In this market, it is the ability of the consumer to bypass
(”crack”) the copy-protection of the monopolist which induces a lower price of
the digital good, compared to an uncontested monopoly (textbook case). We
analyze the complex relationship between the cracking efforts of the consumer,
the copy-protection efforts and the pricing decision of the monopolist, and the
welfare of the economy. We find, for example, that the monopolist will deter
piracy if the (exogenous) relative effectiveness of the consumer’s bypassing
activity is low compared to the copy-protection technology. In this case welfare
is lower than the welfare in the textbook case. On the contrary, welfare
rises above the textbook case level if the relative effectiveness of cracking is
sufficiently high.
Keywords: Digital Products, Contests, Security of Property Rights,
Endogenous Monopoly Price
JEL classification: C72, D23, D42
∗Address correspondence to: Magnus Hoffmann, University of Hannover, Department of
Economics, Institute of Microeconomics, Ko¨nigsworther Platz 1, 30167 Hannover, Germany.
Phone: +49(0)511/762-5626
Fax: +49(0)511/762-2989
Email: hoffmann@mik.uni-hannover.de
We are grateful to Laszlo Goerke, Martin Kolmar, Lambert Schoonbeek and Dana Sisak as well
as to the participants of the PCS, SMYE and IIPF congress 2007 and the seminar participants in
Mainz and Munich for helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.
1 Introduction
Traditionally, non-price-discriminating monopolies are said to cause inefficiencies be-
cause of the differences between the marginal cost of production and the price fixed
by the profit maximizing monopolist. However, given identical preferences on the
consumer side and identical cost functions on the side of miscellaneous monopolists,
identical monopoly prices are more often the exception than the rule. This occurs
because of the different circumstances that persuade a producer to deviate from
the typical textbook profit-maximizing price. For example, the fear of competition
induces monopolists to set a lower price, so as to make it unprofitable for the poten-
tial intruder to enter the market.1 In this paper, we examine a different situation,
in which monopolistic behaviour changes. In our model, a monopolist produces a
digital good for consumption which is demanded by n consumers. This digital good
represents for example music files, copy protected pdf-files or access to pay-tv. The
decisive function of the monopoly good is its ability to be in principle replicable by
consumers, unless it is copy-protected. Thus, any non-authorized copying - which
we will call pirating - produces a good which is non-discriminable from the original.2
It is only possible to replicate a digital product with copy-protection if it is cracked.
Cracking is defined as the attempt to remove the copy-protections inserted into
software programs.3 A program successfully stripped of its protections is then con-
sidered cracked.4 As cracked digital goods can be downloaded free of charge via
internet, they can be reproduced at no marginal cost.5 Since any consumer is aware
of the fact that he can use a cracked digital good at zero marginal costs instead
of buying the good, he is willing to invest scarce resources in order to crack copy-
protected goods of the monopolist. These consumer side efforts, together with the
copy-protection efforts of the producer determine the probability of the monopolist
retaining its control over the market. This probability is modelled by a modification
of the Tullock contest success function (CFS).6 The overall ability to bypass the
copy-protection of the monopolist consists of the sum of efforts of all consumers.
This takes into account the fact that once the digital good is cracked, it can be ob-
tained through the internet free of charge. Thus, the cracking efforts of each single
consumer become a private provision of a public good.
A related model is presented by Leidy (1994), who argues that a monopolist whose
1See Bain (1956), Modigliani (1958) and Sylos Labini (1962) for a classical treatment of this issue,
as well as Dixit (1982) for a critical review.
2As in Peitz and Waelbroeck (2003), we will only consider end-user piracy.
3Given the preferences of agents and the structure of the model, as will become apparent, bypassing
of copy-protection (cracking) is neccesary as well as sufficient in order for the non-authorized
copying (piracy) to occur.
4We assume that the costs of cracking are identical for all consumers, since the tools for cracking
software are obtainable through internet. Well-known (illegal) software programs that bypass
copy-protection are, amongst others, Hex Editor and SoftICE, which can be obtained for free.
5We assume that a digital product can not be sold by the cracker. This is because cracking is
illegal and the cracker would be charged with illegal activities if he invoiced the product.
6Papers which have analyzed differences between players in Tullock contests in a rent seeking
setting are Allard (1988) and Gradstein (1995). For examples of asymmetrical Tullock CSFs in
the property rights literature, see Grossman and Kim (1995) and Grossman (2001).
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right is contested in a political market will spend lobbying efforts, and lower his
price to defuse reformist opposition. The expenditure for copyright protection in
our context are isomorphic to the lobbying efforts to retain the monopoly in Leidy
(1994). Leidy finds a distinct tendency towards lower social cost of monopoly be-
cause of the lower monopoly price. The endogenously determined monopoly price
in our model lies below the textbook monopoly price as long as the consumption
good is challengeable. Leidy can not rule out the possibility that social cost might
increase in some circumstances. In our model, there are welfare-increasing and -
decreasing effects: On the one hand, the lower the probability that the monopoly
continues and the lower the monopoly price, the higher the welfare. On the other
hand, the higher the investment in copy-protection and appropriation, the lower the
welfare. Thus, with regard to welfare, it is possible to determine the circumstances
in which the combined effect is positive or negative.
Another model which is close to ours from a methodological viewpoint does not ad-
dress the question of piracy at all. Epstein and Nitzan (2002) have developed a rent
seeking model for monopoly rents when there is consumer opposition.7 They have
shown that consumer opposition lowers the monopolistic price. The firm trades off
a lower monopoly rent against a higher probability of winning this rent because of
the reduced consumer opposition. A regulation authority, i.e. an outside enforcer,
is needed to ensure that the monopolist charges the price that he announced.8
Apart from literature on rent–seeking, there is a considerable body of literature
which discusses consumers’ individual decision as to whether to buy an original or
to acquire a copy. The following articles on the piracy of digital goods model end-
user piracy either with differences between an original and a copy or with heteroge-
neous consumers. Here, it is the consumer’s private decision to buy an original or a
copy. A survey of piracy of digital goods that focuses on these cases is contributed
by Peitz and Waelbroeck (2003). In these models, the assumption of heterogeneous
consumers is necessary in order to divide the consumers into buyers of the expensive
original or acquirers of the low-quality copy. In our model, however, consumers are
homogeneous, all investing in cracking the digital product. In our context, unlike in
the previous models, a cracked product can be used by all consumers free of charge.
This is due to the fact that a cracked product can be diffused through the internet.
Pricing decisions of producers of information goods in the presence of copying are
analyzed by Belleflamme (2002). He uses a model of vertical quality differentiation,
i.e. copies are seen as lower-quality alternatives to originals. The optimal strategy
for a monopolist who takes into account that consumers can acquire a lower-quality
copy has analogies to the optimal strategy of an incumbent in the face of an entry
threat. Unless the quality/price ratio of copies is very low (meaning that copying ex-
erts no threat), the producer will have to modify his behavior and decide whether to
set a price low enough to ‘deter’ copying, or to ‘accommodate’ copying and make up
for it by extracting a higher margin from fewer consumers of originals. Belleflamme
7See also Epstein and Nitzan (2003) and Epstein and Nitzan (2004) for related models with en-
dogenous prize.
8This poses the question why the regulation authority does not enforce the welfare optimizing
price.
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is able to show that, whatever the producer’s optimal decision, copying reduces the
producer’s profits but more than proportionally increases consumers surplus. Thus,
the possibility of copying provides a cheaper and lower-quality alternative to a mo-
nopolized good, thereby enhances social welfare. In our context, cracking the digital
good only has an enhancing effect on social welfare under certain conditions. As
expected, there is a region of cracking efforts and copy-protection where welfare is
lower than in the standard monopoly case because the outlays of consumers and
the monopolist are dissipated as in a rent seeking game. However, it is worth men-
tioning that cracking can be welfare-enhancing if consumers are relatively effective
in bypassing the copy-protection of the monopolist. In this case, the rent seeking
efforts of consumers cause a higher probability of procuring the good at no marginal
costs, i.e. the monopoly cannot persist, which leads to the welfare optimal price.
To incorporate all significant effects, we introduce a two-stage-game: In the first
stage, the monopolist makes decisions about the supply of the digital good as well
as his investment in copy-protection. Depending on the outcomes of these first stage
decisions, each consumer makes decision individually about his effort to crack the
digital good.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the following sections the
basic structure of the game is outlined as well as the solution in the second and first
stage. Thereafter, there is a discussion of the full game and the welfare effects. A
short concluding summary completes the discussion.
2 The basic structure of the model
Each agent has preferences which can be displayed by the following quasi–linear
utility function:
ui = ϑ(yi) +mi, (1)
with i = 1, . . . , n. yi represents the amount of the monopoly good. mi represents the
consumption of the numeraire good of agent i. We assume the following function to
display the benefit agents get out of the monopoly good:
ϑ(yi) = −b e−yi , (2)
where b is some arbitrarily chosen and positive number which represents the pro-
hibitive price of the digital good for agent i.9 Each agent faces the following budget
constraint:
ωi − p yi −mi −Ai ≥ 0, (3)
where ωi represents the income of agent i, p represents the market price of the
digital good and Ai represents the investment of agent i in order to crack the copy-
protection of the monopoly good. We assume that ωi is sufficiently large so that
9As mentioned earlier, we assume that the amount of the digital good purchased by each agent
is infinitely divisible, which is a justifiable approximation for the presumed markets (music files,
access to pay tv, etc.).
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corner solutions can be ruled out.
Given these assumptions, the resulting demand function subject to any positive
price is
yi(p) =
{
− ln [p
b
]
for p < b,
0 else.
(4)
Aggregating this demand over all n agents delivers the following inverse demand
function, subject to the aggregated supply of the monopoly good x:
p(x) = b e−
x
n , (5)
with x =
∑n
i=1 yi. Thus, given the monopoly supply x, the individual consumer rent
equals
RCi(b, n, x) = b
(
1− x+ n
n
e−
x
n
)
. (6)
In our model, agents have the opportunity to decide whether to invest scarce re-
sources in order to appropriate the monopoly good. Appropriation here means that
they seek to bypass the copy-protection of the monopolist (cracking). If they are
effective in doing so, they will get access to the use of infinite units of the monopoly
good at no additional costs. At first we will concentrate on the prize, that is the
gain agents derive from the bypassing activity. The prize equals the extra consumer
rent each agent gets by getting infinite access to the use of the monopoly good at
zero cost:
ECi(b, n, x) =
x+ n
n
b e−
x
n . (7)
This prize is a decreasing and continuously differentiable function of x. We will call
this prize the extra per-agent gross consumer rent (ECi), since the effort of agents
in order to appropriate the monopoly good is not yet included.
The relations described above are represented by figure 1:
FIGURE 1 HERE
Given a monopoly price p¯, with p¯ < b, the individual consumer rent (RCi) is dis-
played by array I. The additional per-agent gross consumer rent (ECi) is displayed
by the other two arrays. Array II represents the revenue of the monopolist, which
would disappear for the monopolist in case the agents are effective in bypassing the
copy-protection. The third array (III) represents the additional individual consumer
rent if the representative agent would benefit from an infinite access to the monopoly
good, instead of x¯
n
units.
For the display of the contest we make use of a modification of the Tullock CSF
which maps the efforts of consumers and of the monopolist into a probability func-
tion. The effort of each consumer (Ai) is the individual investment out of scarce
ressources in order to crack the copy-protection of the monopolist. The main point
is now that the effort of each single agent is a private provision of a public good, since
all the individuals benefit from the copy-protection bypass activities of each single
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agent. This captures the fact, that the outcome of the copy-protection bypassing
activity is not a private information, but rather displayed publicly. It is because of
this feature, that the probability function (FC(·)) is a function of the sum of efforts
of all agents. The effort of the monopolist is his investment in copy-protection,
which we will denote as Z. If we indicate the sum of all cracking efforts of all agents
with
A =
∑
i
Ai,
the probability function becomes:
FC (A,Z, θ) =
{
0 for Z = 0, A = 0,
θ A
θ A+Z
else,
(8)
with θ ≥ 0. FC represents the probability that the monopoly falls, i.e., the probabil-
ity that the agents are successfull in cracking the copy-protection of the monopolist.
The exogenous parameter θ measures the effectiveness of resources allocated to
appropriating the monopoly good, relative to resources invested by the monopo-
list to protect the monopoly good. It may represent the relative development status
of the copy-protection technology in relation to the appropriating technology. For
θ being equal to zero, appropriation is impossible (the typical monopoly textbook
scenario), for θ going to infinity, the copy-protection of the monopoly good is tech-
nologically impossible (an open source digital good). In order for FC(A,Z, θ) to
be well defined, we assume that the value of FC(A,Z, θ) is zero if the monopolist
invests no ressources in copy-protection and agents invest no effort in bypassing the
copy-protection, which would display the textbook-case of an uncontested monopoly
good.
3 Second stage
Given this structure, each consumer maximizes his expected utility (E[ui]) which
will be labeled vi:
vi =F
C(A,Z, θ)
[
ϑ(y)|y→∞ + ωi − Ai
]
+
(
1− FC(A,Z, θ)
)[
ϑ(y¯) + ωi − p¯ y¯ − Ai
]
⇔ vi =FC(A,Z, θ)ECi(b, n, x) +RCi(b, n, x) + ωi −Ai.
(9)
Thus the expected utility is the composition of two parts: The term in the first
bracket represents the utility in case the monopoly falls, i.e. in case each consumer
has infinite access to the monopoly good. The term in the second bracket represents
the utility in case the monopoly does not fall, i.e. in case each consumer buys
y¯ units of the monopoly good at price p¯, which is simply the price fixed by the
monopolist (cf. figure 1). Hence, the expected utility also equals the utility in case
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the consumers are not successful (RCi + ωi − Ai) plus the extra consumer rent in
case they are successful (ECi) times the probability (F
C).
In the first stage the monopolist decides about the supply of monopoly good (x)
and about the investment in copy-protection (Z). This does not only determine the
value of ECi but also influences directly the probability function (F
C). Contingent
on these first stage decisions the agents in the second stage decide about their
investment in appropriating the monopoly good (Ai). Given the above function,
each agent maximizes his payoff–function subject to one constraint:10
max
Ai
vi
s.t Ai ≥ 0.
(10)
Partial differentiation of the payoff-function delivers the first-order-condition (FOC)
for an interior solution:
θ Z(
Z + θ (Ai + A−i)
)2 ECi(b, n, x) != 1, (11)
where
A−i :=
∑
j 6=i
Aj
represents the efforts of all agents except agent i. On the left hand side (LHS) of
(11) we see the marginal revenue of appropriation, which consists of two parts: The
marginal effect on the probability function times ECi . On the right hand side (RHS)
are the marginal costs for agent i. Since all agents are identical we only concentrate
on the symmetric Nash-equilibrium case.11 Given this assumption, the per-agent
equilibrium level of appropriation becomes:
A∗i =
{
A¯i for Z < Z˜,
0 else ,
(12)
with
A¯i =
√
θ Z ECi(b, n, x)− Z
n θ
(13)
and
Z˜ = θ ECi(b, n, x). (14)
Due to the multi-stage game, there is a level of copy-protection effort Z˜ which
deters the appropriation of the monopoly good by the consumers, i.e. A∗i = 0. In
10The restriction is due to the fact that we do not allow Ai to be negative.
11All calculations can be found in the appendix which will be sent to the reader upon request. We
are aware of the fact that, given the above preferences, we get a continuum of Nash-equilibria.
For tractability of the model we concentrate on the symmetric case. This does not affect the
basic findings of our model.
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this case, the marginal gain of appropriation (LHS of (11)) equals one for the first
marginal investment in appropriation. Thus, the optimal level of appropriation is
zero: Appropriation is deterred. Since ECi is a continuously decreasing function of
x, the level of copy-protection sufficient to deter appropriation is also a decreasing
function of x: The larger the supply of the monopoly good, the lower the investment
in copy-protection necessary to deter appropriation. This is because the value of
the prize declines with increasing monopoly supply. Figure 2 represents this finding:
We see the reaction functions of a representative agent contingent on Z for various
levels of x.
FIGURE 2 HERE
Suppose x > x, than as long as the level of appropriation is positive A∗i (x, Z) <
A∗i (x, Z) for every Z. Moreover, the necessary level of Z to deter appropriation is
smaller for x = x: Z˜(x) < Z˜(x).
The sum of all efforts of agents A∗(x, Z) in the Nash-equilibrium is thus
A∗ =
{
A¯ for Z < Z˜
0 else ,
(15)
with
A¯ = n A¯i. (16)
In the case of a constant prize (ECi), this reaction function is independent of the
value of n due to the quasi-linear preferences.
The following proposition summarizes our main findings thus far.
Proposition 1 (Deterrence) Suppose that all n consumers have identical prefer-
ences and θ ≥ 0.
1. Consumer side efforts in appropriation will be deterred if the level of copy-
protection (Z) equals at least Z˜ = θ ECi(b, n, x).
2. A higher supply of the monopoly good (x) reduces the level of copy-protection
necessary to deter appropriation (Z˜).
In the next section we will examine the behaviour of the profit-maximizing monop-
olist, contingent on the second stage decisions of the consumers.
4 The first stage
In the first stage the monopolist decides about the supply of the digital good and
about his investment in copy-protection. The probability that the monopoly does
not fall is
F = 1− FC =
{
1 for Z = 0, A = 0
Z
Z+θA
else.
(17)
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Inserting the findings of the last subsection (A = A∗(x, Z)), the probability that
the monopoly does not fall (i.e. retains) is a function of x and Z. Assuming zero
marginal costs of production, the profit of the monopolist in the first stage becomes
Π(x, Z) = F (A∗(x, Z), Z)R(x)− Z, (18)
where Z represents the efforts of the monopolist in copy-protection and R(x) denotes
the typical revenue12 of the monopolist, that is
R(x) = b e−
x
n x. (19)
The profit-maximizing problem for the monopolist under these circumstances is
max
x,Z
Π(x, Z) = F
(
Z, A¯(x, Z)
)
R(x)− Z
s.t. (i) x ≥ 0,
(ii) Z ≥ 0,
(iii) A¯(x, Z) ≥ 0.
(20)
The Lagrangian function thus becomes:
L(x, Z) = F (Z, A¯(x, Z))R(x)− Z + λ1 x+ λ2 Z + λ3 A¯(x, Z), (21)
where λ1, λ2 and λ3 represent the shadow prices for violating the non-negativity
constraints on x, Z and A¯(x, Z), respectively. Given these restrictions, the FOCs
are
∂F (·)
∂x
R(x) + F (·) ∂R(x)
∂x
+ λ1 + λ3
∂A¯(x, Z)
∂x
!
= 0, (22)
λ1 = λ3 = 0 =⇒ −
∂F (·)
∂x
F (·) =
∂R(x)
∂x
R(x)
, (22′)
∂F (·)
∂Z
R(x)− 1 + λ2 + λ3 ∂A¯(x, Z)
∂Z
!
= 0, (23)
λ2 = λ3 = 0 =⇒ ∂F (·)
∂Z
R(x) = 1. (23′)
Equation 22 displays the FOC with respect to the optimal supply and equation 22′
represents this FOC for an interior solution, that is, if the constraints on x and
A¯(x, Z) are not binding. One way to view equation 22′ is in terms of elasticities:
The LHS of (22′) can be interpreted as the probability elasticity (a marginal increase
in probability to the total probability). The RHS can be interpreted as the revenue
elasticity (a marginal increase in revenue relative to the total revenue). In optimum
the revenue elasticity has to equal the negative probability elasticity. Even more
insight delivers a further simplified version of the first FOC in an interior solution:
1
2
∂ECi (x)
∂x
ECi(x)
=
∂R(x)
∂x
R(x)
. (22′′)
12We should keep in mind that this revenue function also displays the rent of the monopolist, if
θ = 0, that is for the typical textbook-scenario. This is because the marginal cost of production
is zero.
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The fraction on the LHS of equation 22′′ is unambiguously negative for every positive
level of x. This is due to the fact that the effect of a marginal increase in x on ECi
is always negative since this decreases the possible gains of the copy-protection
bypassing activity (the prize), and ECi itself is positive. The fraction of the right
hand side is positive for x < n and negative for x > n, since these findings apply
to the marginal revenue function and the revenue function itself is always positive.
Hence, for equation 22′′ to be solved, the supply of the monopoly good has to be
greater than n, which would be the profit-maximizing level of output in the textbook
case. Thus, in an interior solution, the monopolist will increase the supply compared
to the supply in the textbook scenario. Moreover, since the revenue function (R(x))
and the extra per-agent gross consumer rent (ECi(x)) are independent of Z, we
know that the profit-maximizing level of x is not contingent on the copy-protection
decision of the monopolist in an interior solution. This finding does not descend
from the supposed demand function.13
Equation 23 displays the FOC with respect to the investment in copy-protection.
For an interior solution, the marginal gains of copy-protection (LHS of (23′)), that
is the marginal effect on the probability function (F ) times the revenue (R(x)), has
to equal the marginal costs of copy-protection (RHS of (23′)).
The resulting profit-maximizing level of x and Z are:14
Z∗(b, n, θ) =
 b θ(2n−θ)e
−n
n−θ
n−θ for θ ≤ θ˜,
b e−
√
2 n2
2 θ(1+
√
2)
else,
(24.1)
x∗(n, θ) =
{
−n (1 +W−1 (z)) for θ ≤ θ˜,√
2n else,
(24.2)
with
z =
e
−2n+θ
n−θ (−2n+ θ)
n− θ .
We find that the restrictions on Z and x are never binding (λ∗1 = λ
∗
2 = 0) ∀ θ ≥ 0.
But as long as θ < θ˜, the restriction on A¯(x, Z) is binding (λ∗3 > 0).
15
FIGURE 3 HERE
13In the mathematical appendix we define several sufficient conditions for a demand function,
derived from a quasi-linear utility function, to make sure the above findings hold in an interior
solution.
14See appendix for calculation. W (z) hereby represents the Lambert function, which is defined
to be the inverse of the function w 7→ w ew = z. This function W (z), which thus verifies
W (z) eW (z) = z, is a multivalued function defined in general for z complex and assuming values
W (z) complex. W−1(z) represents one of two real branches of the W function, but W−1(z) is
the sole function satisfying W (z) ≤ −1 and − 1
e
≤ z < 0, which can be shown to hold for the
above z as long as θ ≤ θ˜.
15So we only have a corner solution with respect to A. Furtheron we will call the case with A∗ > 0
interior solution and the case with A∗ = 0 corner solution.
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For θ = θ˜ the value of the shadow price (λ∗3) equals zero (restriction on A¯(x, Z)
is not binding) and A¯(x∗, Z∗) = 0. We can determine the maximum level of θ to
guaranty the corner solution, which is:
θ˜ =
n
2 +
√
2
. (25)
Hence, the profit-maximizing combination of supply and investment in copy-protec-
tion will deter appropriation if θ is sufficiently small (θ ≤ θ˜), i.e. if consumers are
sufficiently ineffective in bypassing the copy-protection of the monopolist.
For θ = 0, i.e. if appropriation is technologically impossible, the typical textbook
case arises. In optimum the marginal revenue equals the marginal cost of production,
therefore the supply equals n which corresponds with the supply in the textbook
case, and the investment in copy-protection equals zero.
FIGURE 4 HERE
For θ ∈ [0, θ˜], Z∗ increases monotonically (see figure 3) and x∗ increases monotoni-
cally from the level of n to
√
2n (see figure 4).
For θ > θ˜ the interior solution applies. Since consumers are sufficiently relatively
effective in bypassing the copy-protection of the monopolist, deterring appropria-
tion is no longer profit-maximizing. This results in a supply of the digital good of
x∗ =
√
2n, ∀ θ > θ˜. Moreover, the investment in copy-protection declines along the
way, with lim
θ→∞
Z∗(b, n, θ) = 0.
The following proposition summarizes the above findings.
Proposition 2 (Monopolist’s reaction)
1. If the relative effectiveness parameter (θ) equals zero, the marginal revenue
will in optimum equal the marginal costs of production (and therefore x∗ = n)
and the investment in copy-protection is zero (textbook case).
2. If θ ∈]0, θ˜] the optimal investment in copy-protection is sufficient to deter
appropriation (Z∗ = Z˜(x∗(n, θ)), A∗ = 0). Moreover, the optimal level of Z
is flanked by a supply of x which lies above the textbook optimal supply of a
monopolist (x∗ > n).
3. For θ > θ˜, deterring appropriation is no longer profit-maximizing. The supply
of the digital good becomes x∗ =
√
2n and remains unchanged ∀ θ > θ˜. The
optimal level of Z is lower than Z∗
∣∣
θ=eθ
, with lim
θ→∞
Z∗(b, n, θ) = 0 (open source
digital good).
4. The case-separating level of θ (θ˜) is a monotonically increasing function of the
number of consumers (n).
10
5 The full game
In this section we would like to describe the solution in the full game. Turning to the
second stage decision of the consumer on A, it is obvious that for θ being sufficiently
small, the optimal supply/copy-protection decision of the monopolist will induce
deterrence of appropriation, i.e. A∗ = 0. For θ > θ˜, A∗ will become positive:
A∗(b, n, θ) =
{
0 for θ ≤ θ˜,
b e
√
2 n (n−
√
2(n−θ))
2 θ2
else,
(26)
which is a monotonically increasing function of θ for θ ∈]θ˜, θˆ[ and a monotonically
decreasing function of θ for θ > θˆ, with
θˆ = n(2−
√
2). (27)
This fact is captured in figure 5.
FIGURE 5 HERE
Together with the findings of the last section, we are now able to determine the
probability F in equilibrium:
F ∗(n, θ) =
{
1 for θ ≤ θ˜,
n
(2+
√
2)θ
else.
(28)
FIGURE 6 HERE
In the corner solution (θ ∈ [0, θ˜]) the probability equals one since appropriation is
deterred (see figure 6). Thus, property rights are perfectly secure in this interval.
In the interior solution (θ > θ˜) the probability becomes a monotonically decreasing
function of θ, with lim
θ→∞
F ∗(n, θ) = 0. Hence, property rights are insecure for θ being
sufficiently large.
Finally, we take a look at the resulting levels of the consumer rent (RCi) and the
extra per-agent gross consumer rent (ECi) in equilibrium. In the corner solution,
the supply of the digital good rises from n (for θ = 0) to
√
2n (for θ = θ˜). This
does not only reduce the revenue of the monopolist (R(x∗(n, θ))), but also E∗Ci and
increases R∗Ci (see figure 7), with
E∗Ci(b, n, θ) = ECi(b, n, x
∗(n, θ)), (29)
R∗Ci(b, n, θ) = RCi(b, n, x
∗(n, θ)). (30)
Since (E∗Ci) declines along the way, the economic rent subject to appropriation (the
prize) declines, thus reducing the marginal gain of appropriation (see equation (11)).
FIGURE 7 HERE
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We should keep in mind that, since ECi + RCi ≡ b, the reduction of economic
rent subject to appropriation induces a reallocation of the total economic rent in
favour of the individual consumer rent (RCi). In the interior solution, both rents
remain unchanged, since the supply of the monopoly good remains unchanged. The
following proposition recapitulates our findings:
Proposition 3 (Rents, revenue and probability in equilibrium)
1. If appropriation is deterred (θ ∈ [0, θ˜]) in equilibrium, the probability that the
monopoly retains becomes one, i.e. perfectly secure property rights emerge.
Moreover, the individual extra consumer rent (E∗Ci) and the revenue of the
monopolist (R∗) declines as θ approaches θ˜. The individual consumer rent
(R∗Ci) increases along the way.
2. When appropriation becomes positive, the probability F ∗ declines in θ, ∀ θ > θ˜.
The revenue, the individual consumer rent and individual extra consumer rent
are independent from the value of θ, as long as θ > θ˜.
6 Welfare aspects
We now would like to turn to the welfare implications of the game. Traditionally, the
welfare losses due to a monopolistic supply of a consumption good arises because
of the difference between the marginal cost of production and the price required
by the monopolist. Our model incorporates these inefficiencies and broadens this
statement.
The profit function of the monopolist becomes:
Π∗(b, n, θ) = F ∗(n, θ)R(x∗(n, θ))− Z∗(b, n, θ). (31)
Partial differentiation of the profit function subject to θ delivers the marginal profit
function:
dΠ∗(·)
d θ
=
∂F ∗(·)
∂θ
R(x∗(·)) + F ∗(·) ∂R(x
∗(·))
∂x∗(·)
d x∗(·)
d θ
− ∂Z
∗(·)
∂θ
(32)
As long as θ < θ˜, the marginal effect of θ on the probability function is zero, therefore
the first term on the RHS of (32) is zero. The second term is negative, since the
supply of the monopoly good is expanded for rising θ. This has an unambiguous
effect on the marginal revenue. It declines, since the marginal revenue equals zero
in the unconstrained case (θ = 0) and becomes negative ∀ θ > 0. Furthermore, the
third term on the RHS of (32) is positive, since the investment in copy-protection
rises in θ, ∀ θ < θ˜. Thus, the profit declines in θ for θ ∈ [0, θ˜].
For θ > θ˜ the marginal effect of θ on the probability function is negative (see
equation (28), lower case) and the revenue function itself is positive. Thus, the first
term on the RHS of (32) is negative. Since the supply of the monopoly good remains
unchanged ∀ θ > θ˜ (see (24.2), lower case), the second term equals zero. Finally, the
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third term on the RHS of (32) is negative, since the investment in copy-protection
declines with θ, ∀ θ > θ˜. Nevertheless, we are able to show that the combined effect
is unambiguously negative. Hence, ∀ θ ≥ θ˜ the profit function declines in θ.
Turning to the consumer side, we define the consumers’ surplus in optimum as the
sum of all payoff functions of all n individuals:
V ∗(b, n, θ) =
n∑
i=1
v∗i (b, n, θ)
⇔ V ∗(b, n, θ) =n[ (1− F ∗(n, θ))ECi(b, n, x∗(n, θ)) +RCi(b, n, x∗(n, θ))]−A∗(b, n, θ).
(33)
Partial differentiation of V ∗ subject to θ delivers
dV ∗(·)
d θ
= n
[
−∂F
∗(·)
∂θ
ECi(x
∗(·)) + (1− F ∗(·))∂ECi(x
∗(·))
∂x∗(·)
d x∗(·)
d θ
+
∂RCi(x
∗(·))
∂x∗(·)
d x∗(·)
d θ
]
− ∂A
∗(·)
∂θ
.
(34)
For θ < θ˜ the first and second term in brackets on the RHS of equation (34) equal
zero, since F ∗(n, θ) = 1 ∀ θ ∈ [0, θ˜]. The third term in brackets is unambiguously
positive, since the supply (x∗) rises in the named interval and therefore the price of
the digital goods declines. And the forth term on the RHS of (34) equals zero since
appropriation is deterred for θ < θ˜. Therefore V ∗ increases for the aforementioned
interval in θ.
For θ > θ˜ the first term on the RHS of (34) is positive, since ECi > 0 and the
probability that the monopoly retains declines in the named interval. The second
and third term in brackets equal zero, since the extra gross consumer rent (ECi)
and the consumer rent (RCi) remain unchanged ∀ θ > θ˜. Finally, the last term on
the RHS of (34) has an ambiguous sign. For θ > θˆ, A∗ declines in θ and therefore
V ∗ rises in θ. In the case of θ ∈ [θ˜, θˆ[ A∗ rises in θ. We are able to show that the
combined effect is positive in this interval. Hence, for θ ≥ θ˜, V ∗ rises unambiguously
in θ.
If we define the welfare of the economy as the sum of the profit function plus the
consumers’ surplus, we get
W =Π∗(b, n, θ) + V ∗(b, n, θ)
⇐⇒ W =F ∗(n, θ)R(x∗(n, θ)) + n[ (1− F ∗(n, θ))ECi(b, n, x∗(n, θ))
+RCi(b, n, x
∗(n, θ))
]−B∗(b, n, θ), (35)
with
B∗(b, n, θ) ≡ Z∗(b, n, θ) + A∗(b, n, θ) (36)
representing the sum of all efforts in the contest. Partial differentiation ofW subject
to θ delivers:
dW
d θ
=
∂F ∗(·)
∂θ
[R(x∗(·))− nECi(x∗(·))]
+ F ∗(·)
[
∂R(x∗(·))
∂x∗(·)
dx∗(·)
d θ
− n ∂ECi(x
∗(·))
∂x∗(·)
d x∗(·)
d θ
]
− ∂B
∗(·)
∂θ
.
(37)
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Given that θ ∈ [0, θ˜], the first term on the RHS of (37) equals zero, since a marginal
increase in θ does not alter the probability (F ∗). The sign of the second term is
ambiguous, since R∗ and E∗Ci decline with θ. The third term is unambiguously neg-
ative, since A∗ = 0 and Z∗ increases in θ in the aforementioned interval. Hence, the
welfare effect is ambiguous.
FIGURE 8 HERE
For θ > θ˜ the first term becomes positive, since R∗ < nE∗Ci , ∀ θ ≥ 0 and ∂F ∗/∂θ < 0
for θ > θ˜. The second term on the RHS of (37) equals zero, since both, R∗ and E∗Ci
are independent from θ in the named interval. Finally, the sign of the third term is
ambiguous. Thus, the sign of the change in welfare is ambiguous for θ > θ˜.
It is easy to verify that
dW
d θ
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
= −b
e
and (38)
lim
θ→∞
W = n b, (39)
i.e., an incremental increase in θ - starting from the textbook monopoly case - leads
to a decrease in welfare. By continuity of the functions involved, this is also true
in a neighbourhood of θ = 0. Moreover, the welfare in the economy tends to the
welfare in the polypol case if copy-protection of the monopoly good is technologically
impossible (θ → ∞). Furthermore, in the interior solution (θ ≥ θ˜) we find that
there is a unique level of relative effectiveness (θ¯) which causes the coincidence of
the standard textbook case and our model in terms of welfare:
θ¯ =2n
/(
2 +
√
2 + n(1 +
√
2)
−
√
6 + 4
√
2 + n
(
8 + 6
√
2 + 3n+ 2
√
2n
)
− 8
(
1 +
√
2
)
e
√
2−1 n
)
.
(40)
In figure 8 we have plotted welfare (W ) for b = 1 and n = 5. We see that welfare
decreases as long as θ is sufficiently small. Then, welfare increases in the interior
solution, but stays below the textbook case, for θ < θ¯, and rises above this level for
θ > θ¯. For θ →∞ it tends toward b n, the welfare in a competitive economy. Again,
our findings are
Proposition 4 (Welfare aspects)
1. The profit of the monopolist is a decreasing function of θ.
2. The consumers’ surplus is an increasing function of θ.
3. The impact of θ on the total welfare of the economy (W ), defined as the sum
of all consumers’ surplus and the profit of the producer, is ambiguous. The
welfare decreases for small θ. If θ rises above θ¯ welfare is higher than in the
case θ = 0 (standard monopoly case) and tends for θ →∞ to b n, the welfare
in a competitive economy.
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7 Conclusion
Traditionally, monopolies are said to cause inefficiencies because of the differences
between the marginal cost of production and the price fixed by the profit-maximizing
monopolist. Given identical preferences on the consumer side and identical cost func-
tions on the side of miscellaneous monopolists, identical monopoly prices are by far
the exception more than the rule. The reason for this are the various circumstances
that persuade a producer to deviate from the typical textbook profit-maximizing
price. For example, the fear of competition induces monopolists to set a lower price
so as to make it unprofitable for the possible intruder to enter the market. Compared
to the textbook case, in our model the monopolist increases the supply in order to
diminish the incentive for consumers to bypass copy-protection on the monopolist’s
product. Our research demonstrates that inefficiencies increase if the relative effec-
tiveness of cracking is low in comparison to copy-protection. In this case cracking
is deterred by the monopolist, due to the investment in copy-protection and a lower
monopoly price, compared to the textbook case. Hence, the probability that the
monopoly falls is zero. Here, the investment in copy-protection overcompensates the
positive effect on welfare due to the increase in supply of the monopoly good.
If the relative effectiveness increases above a certain value (θ˜) deterring cracking is no
more profit-maximizing for the monopolist. Therefore, the level of copy-protection
decreases and the supply of the monopoly good remains unchanged above the text-
book case. A further increase of the relative effectiveness leads to a value of welfare
which lies above the standard monopoly case (θ > θ¯). In this case the combined
negative effect on welfare due to the unproductive investments in cracking and copy-
protection is overcompensated by the positive effects on welfare due to the increased
supply of the digital good and the higher probability that the monopoly falls.
Thus, we were able to show that for a wide range of relative effectiveness, ”cracking”
induces positive welfare effects in a challenged monopolistic market. This result de-
pends on the quasi-linear utility function, the special form of the Tullock CSF and
the Stackelberg form of strategic interaction. Relaxing these assumptions may result
in ambiguous effects on all relevant endogenously determined parameters. Further
research should focus its attention on generalizing our findings.
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Figures (Place indicated in text)
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Figure 1: The demand function of agent i (yi(p)), the individual consumer rent
(RCi) and the extra per-agent gross consumer rent (ECi).
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Z
Figure 2: The reaction function A¯i(x, Z) for various levels of x
16
Z∗(n, θ, b)
θ˜
θ
Figure 3: Investment in copy-protection contingent on θ.
x∗(n, θ)
θ˜
θ
Figure 4: The supply of the monopoly good contingent on θ.
A∗(n, θ, b)
θ˜
θ
θˆ
Figure 5: The effort of consumers in the copy-protection bypass activity contingent
on θ
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1F ∗(n, θ)
θ˜
θ
Figure 6: The probability that the monopoly retains contingent on θ.
θ˜
θ
E∗Ci
R∗Ci
Figure 7: The individual consumer rent (R∗Ci) and the individual extra consumer
rent (E∗Ci) in equilibrium, contingent on θ.
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Wθ˜
θ
θ¯
Figure 8: The welfare contingent on θ.
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Mathematical Appendix (not for publication)
A Second-stage optimizing
In the second stage each consumer decides about the time he wishes to sacrifice in
order to appropriate the monopoly good. The payoff-maximizing consumer has to
consider certain constraints:
max
Ai
vi(A,Z, x) (41)
s.t. Ai ≥ 0. (42)
Partial differentiation of the payoff function subject to Ai delivers in the symmetric
case, i.e. A−i = (n− 1)Ai :
∂vi(A,Z, x)
∂Ai
=
ECi(x)Z θ
(Z + Ai n θ)2
− 1. (43)
The solution to this FOC is a strictly concave function of Z which equals zero for
Z = Z˜(x), with
Z˜(x) = θ ECi(x). (44)
This yields
A∗i (Z, x) =
{
A¯i(Z, x) for Z < Z˜(x),
0 else ,
(45)
with
A¯i(Z, x) =
√
θ Z ECi(x)− Z
n θ
. (46)
B Profit maximizing in stage 1 (Interior solution)
Given a quasi-linear utility function (ui) and a Tullock CSF we were able to deter-
mine A¯(x, Z). Thus, the profit of the monopolist in the first stage becomes in the
interior solution (x > 0, A > 0, Z > 0):
Π(x, Z) = F
(
Z, A¯(x, Z)
)
R(x)− Z, (47)
with
F
(
Z, A¯(x, Z)
)
=
√
Z
θ ECi(x)
.
Partial derivation of the profit function subject to x delivers
1
2
∂ECi (x)
∂x
ECi(x)
=
∂R(x)
∂x
R(x)
. (48)
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This FOC in the interior solution will always, given a quasi-linear utility function
and the Tullock CSF, arise, if the resulting demand function fulfills the conditions
we will now derive:
If we generally describe the extra per-agent gross consumer rent (ECi(x)) we find
that
ECi(x¯) =
∫ ∞
x¯
p(x) d
x
n
+ p(x¯)
x¯
n
,
where x¯ represents the supply of the monopolist. The first term on the RHS rep-
resents the additional rent due to the fact that each agent gets infinite access to
the monopoly good. The second term represents the expenditure per-agent. Partial
derivation of ECi(x) subject to x delivers
∂ECi(x)
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x¯
=
x¯
n
∂p(x)
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x¯
.
If we display the above FOC (equation (48)) in terms of elasticity, we find that
εp,x
∣∣∣∣
x∗
=
x∗2
2nECi(x
∗)
∂p(x)
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x∗
− 1, (49)
where
εp,x =
∂p(x)
∂x
x
p(x)
,
represents the inverse of the price elasticity of demand. Since the first term of the
RHS of equation (49) is negative, εp,x has to be smaller −1 in optimum, or, in
other words, the monopolist’s optimal supply (x∗(θ, n)) lies on the inelastic part of
the demand function. To guarantee that x∗(θ, n) ∈ ]0,∞[ for the constant supplied
quantity of the monopolist in the interior solution (i.e. A¯(x, Z) > 0), the inverse
demand function p(x) has to satisfy the following sufficient conditions:
• p(x) has to be continuously differentiable,
• lim
x→∞
p(x) = 0,
• p′(x) < 0,
• The elasticity εp,x has to satisfy lim
x→0
εp,x ≥ −1 and lim
x→∞
εp,x < εp,x
∣∣
x∗
.
C Profit maximizing in stage 1 (Corner solution)
The monopolist is aware of the fact that he can deter the challenge of his monopoly,
i.e. he can set Z high enough to enforce A¯ = 0. It is optimal for the monopolist to
switch from the interior solution with A¯ > 0 to the corner solution with A¯ = 0 if θ
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is low enough. To see this, we maximize the monopolist’s profit on condition that
the efforts of the agents are nonnegativ. The Lagrangian function is
L(x, Z) = Π(x, Z) + λ3 A¯(x, Z) (50)
=
√
Z n b e−
x
n
θ (n+ x)
x− Z + λ3
−Z +
√
Z θ b e−
x
n (1 + x
n
)
n θ
, (51)
with Lagrange parameter λ3.
Solving the Lagrangian yields the FOCs
∂ L
∂ x
=
(√
b e−
x
n (1 +
x
n
)
(
−
√
Z λ3 x (n+ x)
√
b e−
x
n Z θ (1 +
x
n
)
+Z n2
√
θ
√
b e−
x
n (1 +
x
n
) (2n2 − x2)
))
/ (52)(
2n2
√
θ (n+ x)2
√
b e−
x
n Z θ (1 +
x
n
)
)
∂ L
∂ Z
=
(
−2Z (λ3 + n θ) (n+ x) +
√
Z λ3
√
θ (n+ x)
√
b e−
x
n (1 +
x
n
) (53)
+n2 x
√
b e−
x
n Z θ (1 +
x
n
)
)
/ (2Z n θ (n+ x))
∂ L
∂ λ3
=
−Z +
√
Z θ b e−
x
n (1 + x
n
)
n θ
(54)
with
∂ L
∂ x
≤ 0 x ≥ 0 x ∂ L
∂ x
= 0, (55)
∂ L
∂ Z
≤ 0 Z ≥ 0 Z ∂ L
∂ Z
= 0, (56)
∂ L
∂ λ3
≥ 0 λ3 ≥ 0 λ3 ∂ L
∂ λ3
= 0, (57)
where the third column represents the complementary slackness conditions.
As we have already solved the interior solution with λ3 = 0 ∧ x > 0 ∧ Z > 0 we
are now seeking the corner solution with λ3 > 0 ∧ x > 0 ∧ Z > 0, i. e. A¯ = 0.
Therefore we can concentrate on the case ∂ L
∂ x
= 0 ∧ ∂ L
∂ Z
= 0 ∧ ∂ L
∂ λ3
= 0.
Solving these equations yields
Z∗(b, n, θ) =
b θ(2n− θ)e −nn−θ
n− θ (58)
and
x∗(n, θ) = −n (1 +W−1 (z)) (59)
with
z =
e
−2n+θ
n−θ (−2n+ θ)
n− θ . (60)
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The change of x∗(n, θ) and Z∗(b, n, θ) in the corner solution subject to a change in
θ is as follows: First, we show that dx
∗(n,θ)
d θ
> 0:
d x∗(n, θ)
d θ
=
∂x∗(·)
∂W−1(z)
∂W−1(z)
∂z
d z
d θ
, (61)
where it is easy to show, that the first part is unambiguously negative. The second
term becomes
W−1(z)
z(1 +W−1(z))
, (62)
which is unambiguously negative, for z ∈ [−1
e
, 0[ and therefore W−1(z) ≤ −1. The
third term becomes
d z
d θ
=
e
−2n+θ
n−θ n2
(n− θ)3 , (63)
which is positive for θ ≤ θ˜ (corner solution).
Second, we show that dZ
∗(b,n,θ)
d θ
> 0:
dZ∗(b, n, θ)
d θ
=
b e−
n
n−θ (2n3 − 6n2 θ + 4n θ2 − θ3)
(n− θ)3 , (64)
with the denominator being positive for θ ≤ θ˜. The nominator is positive as long as
2n(n2 − 3n θ + 2 θ2) > θ3 (65)
⇔ 2n3 > θ(2n2 + (2n− θ)2), (66)
where the RHS of inequality (66) is smaller than θ 6n2 - which is smaller than the
LHS of equation (66) for θ ≤ θ˜ (corner solution).
D Intersection of corner solution and interior so-
lution
At the intersection of the corner solution and the interior solution both factors of
the complementary slackness condition (λ3
∂ L
∂ λ3
= 0) equal zero, i.e. the constraint
is not binding (λ3 = 0), but consumers’ bypassing efforts are zero (
∂ L
∂ λ3
= A¯ = 0).
Thus, ∂ L
∂ λ3
= 0 becomes
θ =
Z∗(b, n, θ)
ECi(b, n, x
∗(n, θ))
. (67)
As we know λ3 = 0, we can use the FOCs of the interior solution (equations (22
′)
and (23′)) to derive easily Z∗(b, n, θ) and x∗(n, θ). Now we can insert this into (67)
23
and solve for the value of θ, where the corner solution and the interior solution
applies:
θ˜ =
n
2 +
√
2
. (68)
For θ → 0 we are in the monopoly textbook-case. Therefore, Z∗ = 0 and x∗ = n,
which corresponds with the upper cases of equations (24.1) and (24.2), i.e. the
corner solution. Since there is only one unique border between corner and interior
solution (θ˜) we find that the corner solution applies for θ ∈ [0, θ˜], by continuity of
the functions involved.
E Change of profit and consumer rent for certain
values of θ
E.1 dΠ
∗(b,n,θ)
dθ
< 0 for θ > θ˜
In this case we find that
R(x∗(n, θ)) =
√
2n b e−
√
2,
∂Z∗(b, n, θ)
∂θ
= − b e
−√2n2
2 θ2(1 +
√
2)
and
∂F (b, n)
∂θ
= − n
(2 +
√
2) θ2
.
Therefore, equation (32) becomes negative for θ > θ˜ as long as
√
2
2 +
√
2
>
1
2(1 +
√
2)
,
which is clearly true.
E.2 dV
∗
d θ
> 0 for θ[θ˜, θˆ[.
V ∗ rises in θ if
n
(
−∂F
∗
∂θ
ECi
)
− ∂A
∗
∂θ
> 0
⇔ e
−√2((3 + 2
√
2)b n θ + b n2(−2−√2 + (6 + 4√2)θ))
2(4 + 3
√
2)θ3
> 0,
which is true for
(3 + 2
√
2)θ(1 + 2n) > n(2 +
√
2), (69)
with the infimum of the LHS of this inequality being (3+2
√
2) n
2+
√
2
(1+2n). Thus,
the inequality (69) holds, as long as n > 1
2
, which is true in our model. Therefore
V ∗ rises unambiguously in θ for θ > 0.
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